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Tax morale and institutional
theory: a systematic review
Ioana Alexandra Horodnic
Management School, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to conduct a systematic review of the factors that shape tax morale.
A large range of random explanatory variables identified in the literature as determinants of tax morale are
synthesised and structured by drawing inspiration from the institutional theory.
Design/methodology/approach – To do this, a systematic search has been conducted using a library
catalogue which provides access to more than 400 databases.
Findings – The finding is that the institutional theory provides a suitable theoretical basis to explore tax
morale. Indeed, all the factors until now identified as determinants of tax morale (except the control
variables/socio-demographic characteristics) can be categorised either as belonging to formal institutions
or to informal institutions. The most salient factor is trust, with both vertical and horizontal trust positively
related to tax morale.
Research limitations/implications – The outcome is a call for a more nuanced understanding of not only
the effect of formal and informal institutions on tax morale but also how formal and informal institutions
interact and alter each other and, consequently, affect tax morale.
Practical implications – The paper seeks to encourage governments to start recognising that as low tax
morale arises when a gap exists between formal and informal institutions, they need to design policy
measures aimed to reduce this gap, rather than persisting with deterrence measures.
Originality/value – This is the first systematic review of the factors that influence tax morale using an
institutionalist lens.
Keywords Informal institutions, Tax compliance, Formal institutions, Tax morale, Horizontal trust,
Vertical trust
Paper type Literature review
1. Introduction
Tax compliance has been extensively researched and yet, the question of why people pay
taxes remains only partially answered. Tax non-compliance continues to represent a core
issue for many governments around the world.
For many decades, the neoclassical approach developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972)
represented the benchmark economic model of tax non-compliance. The model assumes that
tax payers are rational actors who seek to maximise the utility of their taxable income by
weighting the benefits and the cost of compliance with the utility of tax non-compliance.
As such, they will be non-compliant when the expected penalty and probability of being
caught are rather small compared to the utility gained by non-compliance. As a result, the
governments sought to ensure that the utility of non-compliance is outweighed by the cost
of non-compliance and increased the penalties and the perceived probability of detection of the
non-compliant taxpayers (Williams, 2014; Williams and Horodnic, 2015a, 2017a). However,
reducing tax non-compliance is not just a matter of applying higher penalties and/or
increasing the probability of detection. The first to recognise that the model does not capture
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all the rationales of tax non-compliance were the authors themselves as they state in their
paper the following: “This is a very simple theory, and it may perhaps be criticized for giving
too little attention to nonpecuniary factors in the taxpayer’s decision on whether or not to
evade taxes” (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). Indeed, despite its simplicity and clear-cut
policy implications, the model fails to explain why the observed level of tax compliance is
higher than the theoretical predicted level (Leonardo, 2011; Torgler et al., 2007a).
That stimulated the search for alternative models which take into account the non-
pecuniary aspects of the tax compliance decision. As such, after being neglected for decades,
starting in the 1990s, tax morale turned into a key issue in the recent empirical research
on tax compliance (Torgler, 2011; Torgler et al., 2007a).
The aim of this paper is to conduct a systematic review of the factors that influence tax
morale. To do so, a large range of random explanatory variables identified in the literature as
determinants of tax morale are synthesised and structured by drawing inspiration from
institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; North, 1990).
As such, tax morale is viewed in this paper primarily as a result of the interaction between the
formal and the informal institutions. An asymmetry in a society between the laws and regulations
of its formal institutions and the socially shared unwritten norms of its informal institutions will
result in low taxmorale. In Section 1, therefore, the importance of taxmorale in explaining various
forms of tax non-compliance will be briefly reviewed, followed by the methodology and a
structured analysis of the effect of formal and informal institutions on tax morale, alongside the
socio-demographic characteristics related to the variations in tax morale. The paper concludes by
discussing the tentative policy implications and the identified gaps in the literature.
2. Tax morale and tax compliance
The concept of tax morale was introduced for the first time during the 1960s by “Cologne
school of tax psychology” (Schmӧlders, 1970; Strümpel, 1969) but received little attention
from tax researchers for several decades (Alm and Torgler, 2004). Starting in the 1990s, tax
morale increasingly attracted attention and has become a central issue in empirical research
on tax compliance (Torgler, 2011; Torgler et al., 2007a). Tax morale is defined most often as
the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Torgler, 2002b, 2005c, 2012; Torgler and Schneider,
2007a). Luttmer and Singhal (2014) define tax morale as the totality of non-pecuniary
motivations and factors for tax compliance which fall outside the expected
utility maximisation. As mentioned above, in this paper, using an institutionalist lens, the
intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, tax morale, is viewed primarily to result from the
interaction between formal and informal institutions. However, it is important to
acknowledge that personal traits are also important in shaping the individual’s tax morale
and thus, tax compliance behaviour. Previous studies show that there are individuals,
referred to as “honest taxpayers”, which do not try to evade (Torgler, 2001, 2003c) because
they are simply “predisposed not to evade” (Long and Swingen, 1991). The opposite extreme
is represented by the “tax evaders” who, in general, have a low tax morale and act as
rational actors comparing the benefits of evading taxes to the benefits of complying
(Torgler, 2003c). Furthermore, there are individuals who may enjoy evading taxes and
perceive this as a game, playing with the state (Kirchler et al., 2007).
A literature review investigating if tax morale represents a significant factor that affects
tax compliance or rather a marginal one concluded that tax morale plays a sizeable role in
explaining tax compliance decisions (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014). Further support in this
direction is provided by the study conducted on the particular case of the Protestant
church in Bavaria, where tax enforcement is limited or non-existent and where the results
show that about 20 per cent of the individuals paid taxes despite the lack of enforcement
(Dwenger et al., 2016). Indeed, although a high level of tax morality (i.e. an attitude) does not
automatically result in a high level of tax compliance (i.e. a behaviour), analysing the results
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of previous empirical studies, it becomes quickly apparent that tax morale has a strong
effect on various forms of tax non-compliant behaviours. Lower levels of tax morale are
associated with higher levels of tax evasion/lower levels of tax compliance (Brink and
Porcano, 2016; Dell’Anno, 2009; Kirchgässner, 2010; Lima and Zaklan, 2008; Lisi, 2015; Stark
and Kirchler, 2017; Sumartaya and Hafidiah, 2014; Torgler, 2004a; Torgler and Schaffner,
2007; Torgler et al., 2008), higher levels of shadow economy (Halla, 2012; Torgler and
Schneider, 2006, 2007a, b, 2009; Torgler et al., 2007a, b), higher participation in undeclared
work (Williams and Horodnic, 2015c, 2016a; Windebank and Horodnic, 2017) or higher
participation in underreporting wages (Williams and Horodnic, 2015a, b, c, d, e, 2016b,
2017a). Similarly, a large asymmetry between formal and informal institutions was
identified as being positively correlated with the informal payments made by patients for
healthcare services (Horodnic and Williams, 2018; Williams and Horodnic, 2017, 2018).
In order to provide a better understanding of how tax morale is shaped and, therefore, to
identify which policies could improve tax morale, the next sections provide a systematic
review of the factors that influence tax morale. These factors are grouped into three main
categories: formal institutions which include factors related to governance and countries’
structural conditions; informal institutions which include the social influences; and
socio-demographic characteristics and personal values.
3. Data and methodology
3.1 Data sources
For identifying the relevant papers related to tax morale, a systematic search has been
conducted using Sheffield University’s Library Catalogue which provides access to more
than 400 databases, including for example, Ebsco, Econlit, Emerald Insight, Jstor, Proquest,
Sage, Science Direct, Scopus and even Google Scholar. That provided access to journal
papers, working papers, conference papers, books, thesis dissertations and official reports.
The results were displayed by relevance, and we screened the first 300 results generated by
using specific keywords. In addition, the references of the selected papers were checked as
well as the personal pages of the most relevant authors in the field, in order to avoid the
exclusion of important work which might have not appeared in the first search.
3.2 Inclusion criteria
The inclusion criteria were based on the use of the keywords “tax morale” or “tax morality”.
No limitation regarding the type or the year of publication was applied. Only the papers
written in English have been kept. From the initial 600 results (300 for each keyword), after
screening the titles and abstracts less than 200 papers were retained. A detailed review of
these papers found 82 papers that analyse the factors affecting tax morale. Only original
research papers which have used empirical or theoretical models referring to tax morale as a
dependent variable have been kept and displayed in the resultant tables (i.e. those referring
to tax compliance as dependent variable are not included). Literature review type papers, if
relevant, were used for the introduction or for the concluding part of the paper.
Research articles, conference papers, books, thesis dissertations and official reports were
identified and included. When a working paper was subsequently published in a scientific
journal, the published version was kept in the analysis.
4. Results
The array of methods used in the selected papers was heterogeneous, with a predominance
of surveys and laboratory experiments. A variety of secondary and primary sources of data
has been used, including both cross-country data or individual country data. These include
the World Values Survey, the European Values Surveys, the European Social Survey,
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the Eurobarometer survey on undeclared work, the International Social Survey
Programme, the Taxpayer Opinion Survey, the Latinbarometro, the Afrobarometer, the
AsiaBarometer, the Australian Graduates’ Hopes, Visions and Actions Survey, the Bank of
Italy Survey of Household Wealth and Income, the Palestinian Public Opinion Survey, the
Pakistan’s Baseline Taxpayers’ Perception Survey, the Spain’s Survey of Fiscal Policy,
the Spain’s Survey into Tax Morale of the Citizenry or primary data collection via a
self-designed survey. Tables I–III present the synthetised results collected from the
82 papers included in the systematic review. Due to the space limit, for each identified factor,
only the predominant finding is displayed. In the situation that for the same factor an
approximately similar number of papers found divergent results, those are kept and
discussed (see e.g. the findings on deterrence measures in Table I).
4.1 Formal institutions and tax morale
The influence of formal institutions on tax morale represents the main research topic
identified in the tax morale literature (Table I). It is argued that there is a social contract
between citizens and the government and that the individuals pay taxes in exchange for the
services provided by the government (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014; Torgler, 2001, 2002a;
Torgler et al., 2007b). As such, positive actions of the government increase social
commitment and tax morale. The most salient factor influencing tax morale is represented
by vertical trust. Indeed, regardless which public authority is analysed, a high tax morale
level is associated with a high level of:
(1) trust in the government (Andriani, 2016; Chan et al., 2018; Daude et al., 2012; Ibrahim
et al., 2015; Kondelaji et al., 2016; Leonardo, 2011; Li, 2010; Ristovska et al., 2013;
Torgler, 2003b, d, 2004a, b, 2012; Torgler and Schaffner, 2007; Torgler and
Schneider, 2004; Torgler et al., 2007a, b; Trüdinger and Hildebrandt, 2013;
Vythelingum et al., 2017);
(2) trust in the parliament (Alm and Torgler, 2006; Chan et al., 2018; Frey and Torgler,
2007; Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009; Torgler, 2004c, 2005a; Torgler and
Murphy, 2004; Torgler and Schneider, 2004; Torgler et al., 2007a);
(3) trust in court and the legal system/rule of law (Alm and Torgler, 2006; Andriani,
2016; Feld and Torgler, 2007; Filippin et al., 2013; Frey and Torgler, 2007; Torgler,
2003a, b, c, 2004a, b, c, 2005a, b, 2012; Torgler and Murphy, 2004; Torgler and
Schneider, 2004; Torgler et al., 2007a, 2008, 2010; Vythelingum et al., 2017);
(4) trust in the tax authority and tax officials ( Jahnke, 2015; Torgler, 2003b, c, 2004c;
Torgler and Schaffner, 2007; Torgler et al., 2008; Vythelingum et al., 2017),
(5) trust in public officials (Torgler and Schaffner, 2007; Torgler et al., 2008);
(6) trust in politicians (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010);
(7) trust in the president (Torgler, 2005b);
(8) trust in political parties (Chan et al., 2018);
(9) trust in police (Leonardo and Martinez-Vazquez, 2016); and
(10) trust in the European Union (Torgler, 2012).
Similarly, a large body of studies concluded that tax morale depends on perceived fairness
and effectiveness of the government. As such, the more effective the government spending
is perceived (Alasfour et al., 2016; Barone and Mocetti, 2011; Molero and Pujol, 2012; Sipos,
2015; Vythelingum et al., 2017) and the higher is the level of the perceived benefits (Alm and
Gomez, 2008), the higher the level of tax morale. In addition, the transparency of public
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Variable Result Study
Trust in public
authorities
A high trust in public authorities is
associated with high tax morale
Alm and Torgler (2006), Andriani (2016),
Chan et al. (2018), Daude et al. (2012), Feld
and Torgler (2007), Filippin et al. (2013),
Frey and Torgler (2007), Ibrahim et al.
(2015), Jahnke (2015), Kondelaji et al. (2016),
Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010),
Leonardo (2011), Leonardo and
Martinez-Vazquez (2016), Li (2010),
Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2009),
Ristovska et al. (2013), Torgler (2003a, b, c, d,
2004a, b, c, 2005a, b, c, 2012), Torgler and
Murphy (2004), Torgler and Schaffner
(2007), Torgler and Schneider (2004),
Torgler et al. (2007a, b, 2008, 2010),
Trüdinger and Hildebrandt (2013),
Vythelingum et al. (2017)
Government quality/
spending
effectiveness
Higher perceived quality/effectiveness
of spending is associated with higher
tax morale
Alasfour et al. (2016), Alm and Gomez
(2008), Barone and Mocetti (2011), Frey and
Torgler (2007), Molero and Pujol (2012),
Sipos (2015), Vythelingum et al. (2017)
Government fairness
(including fairness of
tax system)
The higher the perceived fairness of the
government, the higher the tax morale
Alasfour et al. (2016), Alm and Gomez
(2008), Çevik (2016), Cyan et al. (2016),
Cummings et al. (2005, 2009), Frey (2003),
Niesiobędzka (2014), Torgler and Schaffner
(2007), Torgler et al. (2008), Vythelingum
et al. (2017)
Deterrence measures No relationship with tax morale Torgler (2003a, b, c), Torgler et al. (2010)
High risk of detection/expected
sanctions associated with higher
tax morale
Torgler and Werner (2005), Torgler et al.
(2007a), Williams and Horodnic (2016c)
Structural conditions
GDP/ GNP Positive impact on tax morale/ positive
correlated
Doerrenberg and Peichl (2010), Gerstenbluth
et al. (2012), Williams and Krasniqi (2017),
Williams and Martinez (2014)
Government
expenditure
(i.e. social protection,
education, health)
Positive impact on tax morale Doerrenberg and Peichl (2010), Williams and
Horodnic (2016c), Williams and Krasniqi
(2017), Williams and Martinez (2014)
Inflation Negative impact on tax morale Doerrenberg and Peichl (2010)
Tax rate The higher the tax rate, the lower the tax
morale. Progressive tax systems
improve tax morale
Alasfour et al. (2016), Doerrenberg and
Peichl (2010), Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas
(2010), Molero and Pujol (2012), Torgler
(2002a, 2003a), Torgler and Murphy (2004),
Torgler et al. (2007b), Williams and
Krasniqi (2017), Williams and Martinez
(2014)
Income inequality
(Gini index)
Negative correlated with tax morale Gerstenbluth et al. (2012), Trüdinger and
Hildebrandt (2013), Williams and Krasniqi
(2017), Williams and Martinez (2014)
Corruption Wider corruption is associated with
lower tax morale
Alasfour et al. (2016), Gerstenbluth et al.
(2012), Jahnke (2015), Torgler (2006),
Torgler et al. (2008), Williams and Krasniqi
(2017), Williams and Martinez (2014)
(continued )
Table I.
Formal institutions
and vertical trust
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spending is associated with higher tax morale (Sipos, 2015). Furthermore, tax morale is
improved if the government and the tax system are perceived by the citizens as being
fair (Alasfour et al., 2016; Alm and Gomez, 2008; Çevik, 2016; Cummings et al., 2005, 2009;
Cyan et al., 2016; Frey, 2003; Niesiobędzka, 2014; Torgler and Schaffner, 2007; Torgler et al.,
2008; Vythelingum et al., 2017).
While the neoclassical approach developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972)
represented the benchmark economic model of tax non-compliance and, therefore, an
overwhelming number of studies investigated the effect of the deterrence measures on tax
compliance, only a few studies sought to investigate this issue with respect to tax morale
and the results are not conclusive. While some studies identified a positive relationship
between tax morale and the perceived level of detection or the perceived sanctions
(Torgler and Werner, 2005; Torgler et al., 2007a; Williams and Horodnic, 2016c), other
studies found no relationship (Torgler, 2003a, 2005a, c; Torgler et al., 2010). However, it is
important to notice that increased levels of deterrence might disrupt the trust between
government and citizens (Pommerehne and Frey, 1992; Torgler, 2001).
Finally, a significant body of papers investigate the influence of the country structural
conditions on tax morale. A higher level of GDP, higher level of government expenditure
and higher level of immigration are positively associated with tax morale. In stark contrast,
higher levels of inflation, income inequality and tax rates are negatively associated with
citizens’ tax morale. Similarly, widespread corruption is associated with lower tax morale
(list of studies in Table I). This suggests that, in countries where corruption is systemic,
citizens have little trust in public authorities and their tax morale decreases because the
obligation of paying taxes does not represent an accepted social norm as citizens feel
cheated (Chan et al., 2018; Saitta, 2017; Torgler, 2001; Torgler et al., 2007b). Therefore,
evading taxes is used by citizens as a self-defence mechanism.
Tax morale increases where there is a closer relationship between the government and
citizens, expressed as legal rights/democracy or local autonomy (list of studies in Table I).
Indeed, studies conducted in different cantons in Switzerland conclude that direct democratic
rights (e.g. constitutional initiative, legislative initiative, legislative referendum, financial
referendum) have positive effects on both tax morale and the size of the shadow economy
(Torgler, 2005a, c; Torgler and Schneider, 2004; Torgler et al., 2007b, 2010). Similarly, the more
extensive is the competence of the local audit courts, which allows a higher transparency of
the budget as well as spending the taxes according to the citizens’ preferences, the higher is
the tax morale (Torgler, 2005a; Torgler et al., 2007b, 2010).
In sum, analysing how formal institutions shape tax morale, it can be concluded that
citizens have a higher tax morale with higher levels of modernisation (i.e. higher GDP, more
Variable Result Study
Democracy/
responsive
regulation/legal
rights
Direct democracy leads to higher tax
morale
Feld and Frey (2004, 2006), Lago-Peñas and
Lago-Peñas 2010, Frey and Torgler (2007),
Martins and Gomes (2014), Sá et al. (2015),
Torgler (2003a, b, c), Torgler and Schneider
(2004), Torgler et al. (2007b, 2010), Williams
and Krasniqi (2017)
Centralisation Centralisation induces lower tax morale.
Local autonomy has a significantly
positive effect on tax morale and the size
of the shadow economy
Güth et al. (2005), Lago-Peñas and
Lago-Peñas (2010), Maria-Dolores et al. (2010),
Torgler (2005a), Torgler and Werner (2005),
Torgler et al. (2007b, 2010)
Level of immigration Higher immigration/immigrants
associated with higher tax morale
Russo (2013), Williams and Martinez (2014)
Table I.
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Variable Result Study
Culture Culture has impact on tax morale. There are
cultural differences within and between
countries influencing tax morale
Alm and Torgler (2004, 2006), Brink and
Porcano (2016), D’Attoma (2015), Feld and
Torgler (2007), Feld et al. (2008), Frey and
Torgler (2007), Horodnic andWilliams (2016),
Kountouris and Remoundou (2013), Torgler
(2002/2003, (2003b, 2004b, c, 2005b, 2012),
Williams and Horodnic (2016c)
National pride/
patriotism
Higher pride in national origin is associated
with higher tax morale
Bilgin (2014), Kondelaji et al. (2016), Leonardo
and Martinez-Vazquez (2016), MacGregor
and Wilkinson (2012), Martinez-Vazquez and
Torgler (2009), Martins and Gomes (2014),
Ristovska et al. (2013), Torgler (2003b, d,
2004b), Torgler and Schneider (2004),
Trüdinger and Hildebrandt (2013)
Religion No difference in tax morale between
different religions
Alasfour et al. (2016), Kanniainen and
Pääkkönen (2010), Torgler (2003d)
Higher religious values/high attendance to
church are associated with higher tax
morale
Alm and Torgler (2004, 2006), Andriani
(2016), Bilgin (2014), Daude et al. (2012), Feld
and Torgler (2007), Feld et al. (2008), Frey and
Torgler (2007), Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas
(2010), Leonardo and Martinez-Vazquez
(2016), Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2009),
Russo (2013), Sá et al. (2015), Torgler (2003a, d,
2005a, 2006, 2012, Torgler and Murphy
(2004), Torgler et al. (2007a, b, 2010),
Trüdinger and Hildebrandt (2013),
Vythelingum et al. (2017)
Sense of community (including peer effect)
Sense of
community
A stronger sense of community fosters
tax morale
Çevik (2016), Russo (2013), Trüdinger and
Hildebrandt (2013)
Community size Those living in larger areas have lower
tax morale
Lubian and Zarri (2011), Williams and
Martinez (2014)
Those living in rural areas have a lower
tax morale
Horodnic and Williams (2016), Williams and
Horodnic (2016a, b), Windebank and
Horodnic (2016)
Civic
participation,
social
responsibility
Positively associated with tax morale Andriani (2016), Barone and Mocetti (2011),
Braithwaite and Ahmed (2005), Cyan et al.
(2016), D’Attoma (2015), Filippin et al. (2013),
Lubian and Zarri (2011), Molero and Pujol
(2012), Russo (2013), Trüdinger and
Hildebrandt (2013)
Political participation and the intensity of
discussing political matters with friends and
family have negative effects on tax morale
Sá et al. (2015), Torgler (2012), Torgler and
Schaffner (2007), Torgler et al. (2008)
Social stigma The social disapproval (social stigma) rise
the tax morale
Çevik (2016), Dell’Anno (2009),
Vythelingum et al. (2017)
Trust
Trust in other
taxpayers
A high trust in other taxpayers is associated
with high tax morale
Çevik (2016), Kondelaji et al. (2016), Martins
and Gomes (2014), Torgler (2004a, 2005b),
Torgler and Schaffner (2007), Torgler et al.
(2008), Trüdinger and Hildebrandt (2013)
Perception of
tax fraud/
evasion (size)
The higher the tax evasion is perceived, the
lower the tax morale
Alm and Gomez (2008), Çevik (2016), Frey
and Torgler (2007), Molero and Pujol (2012),
Torgler and Schaffner (2007)
Table II.
Informal institutions
and horizontal trust
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Variable Result Study
Gender Women have higher tax morale
than men
Alm and Torgler (2004, 2006), Chan et al. (2018),
Cyan et al. (2016), Doerrenberg and Peichl (2010),
D’Attoma (2015), Feld and Torgler (2007),
Horodnic and Williams (2016), Leonardo and
Martinez-Vazquez (2016), Li (2010), Maria-Dolores
et al. (2010), Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2009),
Russo (2013), Torgler (2003a, b, c, d, 2004a, c, 2006,
2012), Torgler and Murphy (2004), Torgler and
Schneider (2004), Torgler and Werner (2005),
Torgler et al. (2007a, b, 2008), Williams and
Horodnic (2016a, c), Williams and Martinez (2014),
Windebank and Horodnic (2016)
Age Older people have higher tax morale Alasfour et al. (2016), Alm and Gomez (2008),
Alm and Torgler (2004, 2006), Barone and
Mocetti (2011), Bilgin (2014), Braithwaite and
Ahmed (2005), Chan et al. (2018), Daude et al.
(2012), Feld and Torgler, 2007, Feld et al., 2008,
Filippin et al. (2013), Frey and Torgler (2007),
Horodnic and Williams (2016), Kondelaji et al.
(2016), Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010),
Leonardo andMartinez-Vazquez (2016), Li (2010),
Lubian and Zarri (2011), Martinez-Vazquez and
Torgler (2009), Nordblom and Žamac (2012) ,
Ristovska et al. (2013), Torgler (2002/2003,
2003b, c, d, 2004a, b, c, 2005b, 2006, 2012),
Torgler and Murphy (2004), Torgler and Werner
(2005), Torgler et al. (2007a), Trüdinger and
Hildebrandt (2013), Vythelingum et al. (2017),
Williams and Horodnic (2016c), Williams and
Martinez (2014), Windebank and Horodnic (2016)
Marital Status Married people have higher tax morale
than singles
Alm and Torgler (2004, 2006), Chan et al. (2018),
Doerrenberg and Peichl (2010), Feld and Torgler
(2007), Feld et al., 2008, Li (2010), Torgler (2003a,
b, c, 2004a, c, 2005b, 2006, 2012), Torgler and
Murphy (2004), Torgler and Werner (2005),
Torgler et al. (2007b), Vythelingum et al. (2017),
Williams and Horodnic (2016c), Williams and
Krasniqi (2017), Windebank and Horodnic (2016)
Financial/
economic
status
Higher satisfaction with financial
situation is correlated with higher
tax morale
Alasfour et al. (2016), Alm and Torgler (2004),
Barone and Mocetti (2011), D’Attoma 2015,
Filippin et al. (2013), Ibrahim et al. (2015),
Kondelaji et al. (2016), Lago-Peñas and Lago-
Peñas (2010), Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler
(2009), Martins and Gomes (2014), Ristovska et al.
(2013), Torgler (2003a, d, 2004a, c, 2005b, 2006),
Torgler et al. (2007b), Williams and Horodnic
(2016c), Williams and Krasniqi (2017),
Williams and Martinez (2014), Windebank and
Horodnic (2016)
Social class Higher economic class is associated with
lower tax morale
Alm and Torgler (2004), Li (2010),
Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2009),
Torgler (2004b, 2006)
Life
satisfaction
Individual’s life satisfaction increases
tax morale
Martins and Gomes (2014), Sá et al. (2015),
Torgler (2003b, 2004b, 2005b)
(continued )
Table III.
Socio-demographic
characteristics
and personal
values/norms
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effective social protection measures, lower level of inequalities and corruption), higher trust
in public institutions and the fairness and effectiveness of public spending, as well as with
higher participation in deciding on how public money is spent.
4.2 Informal institutions and tax morale
In behavioural sciences, individuals are not investigated as isolated entities but rather in
relation to their social groups and cultures (Cullis and Lewis, 1997; Steinmo, 2017). As such,
the individual attitude and behaviour is shaped by the informal institutions which refer to
the socially shared unwritten norms, values and beliefs. The violation of social norms
results in internal sanctions (i.e. guilt, shame) or external sanctions such as social stigma
(Torgler, 2001; Torgler et al., 2007a). What is therefore the influence of informal institutions
on tax morale?
Starting with culture, which represents broad social norms which are persistent in time
(Luttmer and Singhal, 2014), a large body of literature identifies a relationship between
the informal institutions and tax morale. Analysing individuals living in the same
environment but from different cultures, Kountouris and Remoundou (2013) investigate
the level of tax morale of first-generation immigrants in Europe and concludes that the tax
Variable Result Study
Employment
status
Self-employed persons have lower tax
morale than employees
Alm and Torgler (2006), Chan et al. (2018), Daude
et al. (2012), Doerrenberg and Peichl (2010),
D’Attoma (2015), Filippin et al. (2013), Frey and
Torgler (2007), Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas
(2010), Lubian and Zarri (2011), Torgler (2003b, c,
2004b, c), Torgler et al. (2007a), Williams and
Martinez (2014)
Part-time employees, unemployed people
and students have lower tax morale than
full-time employees
Daude et al. (2012), Torgler (2003a, c, d, 2004b, c),
Williams and Martinez (2014)
Pensioners/retired have higher tax
morale relative to non-pensioners
Cyan et al. (2016), Doerrenberg and Peichl (2010),
Feld et al., 2008, Martins and Gomes (2014),
Torgler (2005c), Torgler and Murphy (2004),
Vythelingum et al. (2017)
Housewives/housekeepers have lower
tax morale
Ibrahim et al. (2015), Williams and Martinez (2014)
Those engaged in undeclared work have
lower tax morale
Horodnic and Williams (2016), Williams and
Horodnic (2016a, c, 2017b), Windebank and
Horodnic (2016)
Education Better educated persons have higher tax
morale
Alasfour et al. (2016), Alm and Gomez (2008),
Barone and Mocetti (2011), Cyan et al. (2016),
Daude et al. (2012), D’Attoma (2015), Filippin et al.
(2013), Li (2010), Lubian and Zarri (2011),
Rodriguez-Justicia and Theilen (2018), Torgler
(2003a, 2005c, 2012), Torgler et al. (2007b),
Williams and Horodnic (2016c), Williams and
Krasniqi (2017)
Support for
democracy
Support for democratic values is
associated with high tax morale
Daude et al. (2012), Leonardo (2011), Leonardo
and Martinez-Vazquez (2016), Torgler (2003b,
2004b), Torgler and Schneider (2004)
Moral norms Personal integrity increases tax morale Bilgin (2014), Dell’Anno (2009), McKerchar et al.
(2013), Torgler (2006)
Individuals’
aversion to
ethnic diversity
Higher aversion to ethnic diversity is
associated with lower tax morale
Belmonte et al. (2018)
Table III.
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morale in the country of origin affects the tax morale of the individuals in the hosting
country. Similarly, comparing the tax morale in a similar environment in terms of
deterrent measures yet with different cultural features, a higher tax morale was identified
in East than in West Germany, which shows that tax morale is driven rather by other
factors than deterrents such as informal institutions (Feld and Torgler, 2007; Feld et al.,
2008; Torgler, 2002/2003). Cross-cultural studies show that there is a significant difference
in the level of tax morale between countries and that the level of patriotism directly affects
tax morale (list of studies in Table II). For example, tax morale is lower in Eastern Europe
as compared with Western Europe, and this might be explained by the institutional crisis
experienced by ex-communist economies (Frey and Torgler, 2007). Indeed, analysing
Hofstede’s dimensions of culture, the finding is that the level of tax morale is lower in
those cultures where the distance to power is higher (Brink and Porcano, 2016). Turning to
religion, no difference in tax morale between different religions has been identified
(Alasfour et al., 2016; Kanniainen and Pääkkönen, 2010; Torgler, 2003d). However,
religiosity, measured mostly as the frequency of attendance at church, is positively
associated with tax morale (list of studies in Table II). Similarly, a stronger sense of
community in general terms, not only from a religious point of view, positively affects the
tax morale. The stronger the feeling of belonging to the community (Çevik, 2016), social
responsibility (Braithwaite and Ahmed, 2005; Cyan et al., 2016) and civic participation,
measured as active participation in the community, participation in voting or civic duty
(Andriani, 2016; Barone and Mocetti, 2011; D’Attoma, 2015; Filippin et al., 2013; Lubian
and Zarri, 2011; Molero and Pujol, 2012; Russo, 2013; Trüdinger and Hildebrandt, 2013),
the higher the tax morale. Meanwhile, the social disapproval of tax cheaters increases tax
morale (Çevik, 2016; Dell’Anno, 2009; Vythelingum et al., 2017). In contrast, and related
with both horizontal and vertical trust, the intensity of discussing about tax authorities
and/or political matters with colleagues, family and friends (Torgler, 2012; Torgler and
Schaffner, 2007; Torgler et al., 2008) or political participation (Sá et al., 2015), has a
negative effect on tax morale. This might suggest that the individuals share rather
negative experiences related to the public authorities that, in turn, reduce vertical trust
and therefore the tax morale of the entire group. Similarly, when discussing with friends
and family, if some particular honest individuals become aware that other peers cheat in
respect to their tax due, their own tax morale is reduced due to a reduced horizontal trust.
Indeed, horizontal trust has a strong impact on the individuals’ tax morale. When the
members of a community have a high trust in other taxpayers, their tax morale is
increased (Çevik, 2016; Kondelaji et al., 2016; Martins and Gomes, 2014; Torgler, 2004a,
2005b; Torgler and Schaffner, 2007; Torgler et al., 2008; Trüdinger and Hildebrandt, 2013).
In opposition, where the perceived level of tax evasion is high and the other taxpayers are
perceived as free riders, citizens’ tax morale is lower (Alm and Gomez, 2008; Çevik, 2016;
Frey and Torgler, 2007; Molero and Pujol, 2012; Torgler and Schaffner, 2007).
In sum, by analysing the effect of informal institutions it can be concluded that cultures,
sub-cultures (within countries), communities and social groups affect tax morale. Individual
tax morale is shaped by the behaviour of other members of the community. When tax
compliance is considered a social norm and therefore being a cheater leads to exclusion and
social disapproval, tax morale increases. On the contrary, where there is a low horizontal
trust in a society and individuals perceive that a large share of the population evades taxes,
the level of tax morale of honest tax payers is lowered.
4.3 Socio-demographic characteristics and personal values
Table III displays the most prevalent results regarding individuals’ characteristics and the
level of tax morale. Unlike the results presented in Tables I and II, where the link between the
investigated variables and tax morale represented main research questions of the analysed
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studies, the socio-demographic characteristics were used in general as control variables and
included in the majority of empirical studies. As such, considering the large number of studies
and the different sample size and geographical areas, the results were not similar. Table III
displays the most prevalent result for each socio-demographic characteristic.
Tax morale is positively related to socio-demographic factors such as age, education,
income and life satisfaction, and tends to be lower among upper social class. Tax morale
tends to be higher among women and married people. Regarding the employment status,
tax morale tends to be higher among pensioners and lower among self-employees, part-time
employees, students, housewives/housekeepers, unemployed and those engaged in
undeclared work (list of studies in Table III).
Turning to the individual’s norms and values the findings in previous studies show that
a higher moral integrity and a more pronounced feeling of guilt in evading taxes are
positively related to tax morale (Bilgin, 2014; Dell’Anno, 2009; McKerchar et al., 2013;
Torgler, 2006). Similarly, with the results regarding the level of democracy as a structural
condition, the individuals’ support for democracy and democratic values are positively
related to tax morale (Daude et al., 2012; Leonardo, 2011; Leonardo and Martinez-Vazquez,
2016; Torgler, 2003b, 2004b; Torgler and Schneider, 2004). In contrast, a higher aversion to
ethnic diversity is associated to lower tax morale (Belmonte et al., 2018).
In sum, this section provided support for identifying the individual socio-demographic
characteristics of those more likely to have a lower tax morale (i.e. younger people, male,
housekeepers and unemployed or undeclared workers, those with low income, etc.) which
might represent the target groups for policy measures related to awareness campaigns,
tax education, etc.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
This paper has provided a systematic review of the factors related to tax morale. Drawing
inspiration from the institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; Helmke and Levitsky,
2004; North, 1990), tax morale has been viewed in this paper primarily to result from
the interaction between formal and informal institutions. As such, an asymmetry between
the laws and regulations and the socially shared unwritten norms results in low tax morale.
Evaluating the influence of formal institutions on tax morale, the first policy lesson is
related to the limitations of the rational economic actor model. As previous studies show,
increasing the level of deterrents produces inconclusive results (Torgler, 2003a, 2005a, c;
Torgler and Werner, 2005; Torgler et al., 2007a, 2010; Williams and Horodnic, 2016c) and
might lead rather to lower tax morale and, consequently, lower tax compliance. Therefore,
governments can use other measures beyond enforcement for improving citizens’ tax
morale and, consequently, their tax compliance.
Hence, measures for changing the formal institutions are required. As such, measures are
needed not only for modernising government and for improving the structural economic
and social conditions but also for building trust in public authorities. An extensive body of
literature shows that tax morale is low, with low trust in various public authorities
(i.e. government, parliament, courts and legal system, tax authority, etc.). Furthermore, the
perceived fairness and effectiveness of the government spending as well as the perceived
level of corruption shape the tax morale. As such, measures aimed to improve the social
contract between governments and citizens and to foster the horizontal trust are necessary.
This requires improvements in procedural justice (i.e. citizens are treated in a respectful,
impartial and responsible manner by the tax authority, shifting away from a “cops and
robbers” approach), procedural fairness (citizens perceive that the share they pay is fair in
comparison with the share paid by others) and redistributive justice (citizens believe
that they receive the goods and services they deserve according to the paid taxes)
(Kirchgässner, 2010; Molero and Pujol, 2012; Murphy, 2005; Williams and Horodnic, 2015a).
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Second, informal institutions are proven to shape tax morale as well, and measures
aimed to alter informal institutions are thus required. As long as paying taxes owed does not
represent a socially accepted norm, tax morale will be low. However, the results from
previous studies show that governments have the capacity to influence social norms.
As such, the governments can improve the transparency of public spending, can use
awareness raising campaigns for providing information on what public goods and services
are paid from taxes or can encourage tax education. For example, a study in UK shows that
sending letters reminding the taxpayers how their taxes contribute to the public goods leads
to a decrease in delaying tax payments (Hallsworth et al., 2017). Similarly, a study conducted
in Turkey and Spain shows that tax education in universities has a positive effect on the
level of tax morale (Goksu and Sahpaz, 2015).
As a lack of trust in other taxpayers and the perception that tax evasion is widespread in
a society negatively affects tax morale, measures aimed at fostering horizontal trust are also
required. This can be achieved, for example, by providing to citizens’ information about
their peers’ behaviour (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014). For example, a study conducted in the
UK investigated whether different messages about the peers’ behaviour influence timely
payments (Hallsworth et al., 2017). Three different messages were included in the study,
namely, “nine out of ten people pay their tax on time”, “nine out of ten people in the UK pay
their tax on time” or “nine out of ten in the UK pay their tax on time. You are currently in the
very small minority of people who have not paid us yet”. All three messages proved to have
a positive effect on timely payments with the highest effect for the third message which
underlines that the individual falls in the minority of those non-compliant.
In sum, this paper has outlined the influence of formal and informal institutions on tax
morale as well as the socio-demographic characteristics of those displaying low/high tax
morale. Thus, by synthesising and structuring the factors that shape tax morale, the paper
provides a useful tool for both researchers and policy makers. Researchers can easily
acknowledge what was investigated so far in the field and the type of methods and data.
For policy makers, the paper provides not only an overview of the population groups more
susceptible to low tax morale, who therefore, can be targeted in future campaigns, but also
the type of policy measures and narratives that are more likely to enhance tax morale.
If governments start recognising that low tax morale and consequently high tax
non-compliance arise when a gap exists between formal and informal institutions and begin
exploring policy measures to reduce this gap, rather than persisting with deterrence
measures, then this paper will have achieved its objective.
6. Directions for future research
As shown in this paper, in the past decades, a large number of studies have focussed on
understanding tax morale and its role in tax compliance. However, the vast majority are
based on cross-sectional analyses. Considering that tax morale and the individuals’
willingness to comply can change over time (Torgler, 2002a), more longitudinal analyses
would enable researchers to measure how different policy measures shape tax morale and
how tax morale is altered by these measures.
Formal and informal institutions are influencing each other. Not only the government
can use measures to alter formal institutions in a positive way for improving tax morale and
tax compliance, but so too can citizens influence state morale by electing and voting officials
that closer express their views and expectations on formal institutions. As such,
investigating the interaction effects between formal and informal institutions in shaping the
tax morale might lead to new important insights. Chan et al. (2018) made a step in this
direction by analysing the interaction effects between vertical and horizontal trust in
108 countries. The results reveal a multiplier effect of trust on tax morale: “horizontal trust
breeds vertical trust and vice versa” and shows that horizontal trust (measured as
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generalised trust), varies under different levels of vertical trust and structural conditions
(Chan et al., 2018). Future studies to better understand this should now be undertaken.
Finally, the vast majority of studies on tax morale and tax compliance have used surveys
or laboratory experiments. Rather recently, a few studies (see e.g. Hallsworth, 2014;
Hallsworth et al., 2017) have started to use field experiments in collaboration with the tax
authorities. This approach not only creates a bridge between the research results and the
design of policy measures but also eliminates the shortcomings of the artificial conditions
created in laboratory experiments and enables us to observe the direct effect of a specific
policy measure.
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